The most recent military conflicts have introduced the world to a new method of warfare. The Unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV) which has been a trademark of the previous conflicts of the 21st century has been partially replaced by the loitering munition. The loitering munition seems to be so incredibly accessible and affordable that the proliferation of this type of weapon across the world might destabilise the current world order.
The trademark of the loitering munition is found in its employment, namely as a “suicide drone” or “One-way attack drone”. The drone destroys itself by crashing itself into the target. The weapon is therefore extremely expendable. The lack of reusability of any expensive systems due to the destruction of the drone emphasises the benefit of making these types of weapons as inexpensive and simple as possible. The Russian-Ukrainian war is trademarked by the extensive use of these loitering munitions which can destroy military vehicles, troop concentrations and even air-defence systems. Even helicopters have been successfully targeted by loitering munitions.
In Ukraine, but also in other conflicts worldwide, small loitering munitions cannot be effectively targeted by conventional air-defence systems meant for destroying missiles, planes, and helicopters. This means that cheap loitering munitions can destroy protected targets more effectively than other aerial weapons in certain situations. The low cost of the weapon seems to be most threatening concerning loitering munitions and the fact that even air defence systems can effectively be targeted by these loitering munitions.
Examples of the latter can be found in Ukraine, where primarily Russian air-defence systems are targeted by loitering munitions, but also in Saudi Arabia’s war against the Houthis, where western, NATO-standard Patriot batteries are seemingly ineffective.
The Russian Federation has also employed Iranian loitering munitions in the form of the Shahed-136, an Iranian-made drone which costs tens of thousands of dollars per unit. Ukraine has been forced to employ Western-made air defence systems which fire munitions costing much more than the drone itself. This also adds an economic factor to warfare concerning loitering munitions. Furthermore, the inexpensive loitering munition can destroy military equipment which is much more expensive to produce.
Taking into account the military value and employment of these loitering munitions, one must ask oneself how the introduction of this new weaponry can influence global politics. It is not the technology itself that is revolutionary, but the lower cost of loitering munitions which makes them accessible to underfunded militaries or even irregular forces. The lower costs allow for the employment of a large number of loitering munitions which puts an even larger strain on the capabilities of air defence systems, which already struggle to effectively shoot down the smaller loitering munition variants.
This development allows smaller states or irregular forces to more easily combat much better-funded militaries. The most recent example can be found at the start of the Israel-Hamas war, in which Israeli tanks and surveillance systems were destroyed by Ukraine-inspired loitering munitions. This example is quite telling because the Israeli military is well known for its excellent air defence capabilities such as the Iron Dome.
Shortly, the proliferation of loitering munitions without a mass-producible, relatively affordable countermeasure could hinder the possibility of first-class militaries effectively engaging in counter-insurgency operations or even full-force operations such as the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
The enforcement of Hard power through military interventions or counter-insurgency operations would only be possible after either the acceptance of higher military losses or the investment into the development of effective countermeasures. Furthermore, it seems that Iran is capable of producing loitering munitions at a quite competitive price. This could lead to a further destabilization of the Middle East as pro-Iran or Iranian-aligned forces would have a more even playing field in comparison to Western militaries in the region.
Loitering munitions also add a certain level of plausible deniability concerning offensive actions. A large portion of Ukrainian-used loitering munitions are civilian drones modified for military use. This creates the possibility for states or political groups to attack a rival entity without having to take any responsibility, opening the door to further destabilization or provocation in already unstable regions.
In summary, the proliferation of loitering munitions has proven possible due to their lower cost. The loitering munitions are difficult to combat, even for well-funded militaries. When the decision is made to combat these loitering munitions, it is not cost-effective. The loitering munition can also destroy top-notch military hardware. This could lead to a lack of political will to engage in conflict from Western countries, who have traditionally been more cautious to engage in casualty-intensive conflict. Furthermore, already unstable regions can become even more volatile as previous power structures are challenged by this shift in military technology. However, the effect of the loitering munition could be overstated. Quite primitive defences and countermeasures seem to be quite effective in the Russia-Ukraine war, and while drones dominate the battlefield today, this may change as tactics and technologies are altered. In general, the effect of military innovation on the power structures within geopolitics should not be ignored. History has taught us that these innovations can be revolutionary on a political and social level.
Author: Thomas Westra
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